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Abstract 
 
This paper experimentally examines the relationship between self-reporting risk 
preferences and behavioral choices in the subsequently played dictator, ultimatum 
and investment games. The results from these experiments are used to discern the 
motivational bases of behavioral choices in the ultimatum and investment games. 
The focus is on investigating whether strategic considerations are important for 
strategy selection in the two games. We find that self-reporting risk preferences does 
not alter the dictators’ offers and trusters’ investments, while it significantly 
decreases the proposers’ offers and leads to a substantial decrease in the amount 
trustees give back to their partners. We interpret these results as evidence that the 
decisions of proposers in the ultimatum game and trustees in the investment game 
are strategic. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The role of individual risk attitudes in the determination of outcomes in many 
economic games is indisputable. Coordination games, for example, are one class of 
games for which it is well-known that beliefs and risk preferences jointly determine 
strategy choices. The dictator game, on the other hand, by its nature, is a degenerate 
game that removes incentives for strategic behavior. There are, however, also games 
for which the motivational bases of behavioral choices are still a debatable issue. 
The ultimatum game (Güth et al. 1982) and the investment game (Berg et al. 1995) 
are two examples of such games. Despite the great number of studies dedicated on 
analyzing them, researchers have not come to an agreement regarding the 
relationship between risk attitudes and behavioral choices in these games. 
 In this paper, we present results from a laboratory experiment that adds one 
piece of evidence to the discussion about the motivational bases of behavioral 
choices in the ultimatum game (UG) and the investment game (IG). Specifically, we 
examine whether decisions in these games are influenced by the act of answering a 
set of risk questions and use our results to draw inferences about the relationship 
between risk attitudes and behavioral choices in each of the studied games. For 
methodological reasons, we also study the behavior in the dictator game (DG). For 
each game, we consider two conditions—one in which subjects directly play a 
standard version of the corresponding game (the control condition) and one in which 
subjects first report their own risk preferences on a short questionnaire and then play 
the same game as the participants in the control condition (the treatment condition). 
We then compare behavioral choices in the two conditions. We stress the point that 
we do not argue that the risk questionnaire we use is a good method for measuring 
risk preferences. Rather, we are interested to study the link between the act of stating 
one’s own risk preferences and behavioral choices in the three economic games. 
Standard economic theory predicts that subjects, who complete a questionnaire 
about their own risk preferences before playing a certain economic game, will not 
make different choices from those who play the game right away (internal 
consistency of preferences assumption). Deviations from these predictions can be 
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used to better understand the determinants of behavioral choices in the games we 
examine. 
 A risk questionnaire is used in this study with the purpose of investigating the 
relationship between risk preferences and behavioral choices in the DG, UG, and IG. 
This is motivated by the “unexpected” in light of the standard economic theory 
finding of Berninghaus et al. (2011) that states that the mere measurement of 
subjects’ risk preferences on a risk scale systematically alters strategic behavior in a 
subsequently played coordination game. Berninghaus et al. (2011) report that the 
proportion of subjects who choose the risk dominant strategy in the coordination 
game is significantly higher for subjects who have first reported their own risk 
preferences. After controlling for subjects’ first-order beliefs, Berninghaus et al. 
(2011) find that the act of stating one’s own risk preferences does not change beliefs. 
Within a best-response correspondence framework, this result implies that subjects 
had become more risk-averse after they reported their risk preferences. Behavioral 
arguments, such as focal points, framing and uncertain preferences offer an 
alternative explanation of the effect that the risk questionnaire produced on strategy 
choices in the coordination game. 
 The purpose of this study is twofold. First we aim at extending the results of 
Berninghaus et al. (2011) beyond coordination games in finding out how a simple, 
non-strategic decision situation, such as stating one’s own risk preferences 
influences behavior in the DG, UG, and IG. Second, we use the results from the 
effect that the risk questionnaire produces on behavioral choices to analyze the 
motivational bases of decision-making in the studied games. Specifically, we are 
interested in drawing inferences about the question whether decisions in the UG and 
IG involve strategic considerations. Our study relates to a large body of literature 
analyzing the determinants of strategy choices in the UG and IG.  
 The UG and the DG present very similar bargaining situations with one 
difference between them being that the passive second player in the DC is given the 
ability to reject the proposer’s offers in the UG. In both games, experimental results 
show that people strongly deviate from the predictions of the subgame perfect 
equilibrium. Another difference between the games is that while there is little 
controversy in explaining the discrepancy between the theoretical predictions and 
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actual choices in the DG with reference to altruism or fairness considerations, 
explaining the results from the UG by mere concerns for fairness turns out to be 
troublesome. Henrich et al. (2005) describe fairness as the readiness of people to 
incur personal costs in order “to change the distribution of material outcomes among 
others, sometimes rewarding those who act pro-socially and punishing those who do 
not.” Empirical findings suggest that people have preferences for being treated fairly 
(see e.g., Kahneman et al. 1986). Camerer and Thaler (1995), however, argue that 
preference for fairness is not an innate but rather a learnt manner, which is expected 
in social settings. The conclusion of Camerer and Thaler (1995) leaves room for 
speculations that behavior that seems fair might not be driven by preferences for 
fairness per se but rather be dictated by the desire to adhere to cultural and social 
norms. 
 The question whether fairness can explain the unexpectedly high positive 
offers in the UG was extensively studied. Fehr and Schmidt (1999) model fairness as 
self-centered inequality aversion. They define inequality aversion as the tendency of 
people to resist inequitable outcomes, often at a personal cost. They show that the 
results from the UG experiments could be explained by allowing subjects’ utility 
function to incorporate the inequality aversion preferences. The theoretical work of 
Fehr and Schmidt (1999) suggests that proposers in the UG make considerable 
positive offers because they dislike inequality and care about fairness. 
 Forsythe et al. (1994) use a dictator control game to test whether fairness 
considerations can explain the results in the UG. They find that the average 
allocation in the DG (20 percent) is much lower than the average offer in the UG 
(40-50 percent) and conclude that fairness must only be one factor that determines 
proposers’ choices in the UG. Güth and van Damme (1998) use a modified version 
of the UG in which an inactive third player is introduced. They compare results from 
different information conditions and conclude that proposers were not interested in 
fairness per se. They simply wanted to seem fair. Kagel et al. (1996) also find that 
the impression of fairness and not fairness itself motivated proposers in an UG 
experiment. Roth et al. (1991) and Bahry and Wilson (2006) find evidence that 
proposers make offers that are the best replies to actual pattern of rejections or to the 
norm of fairness. This result, consistent with the argument of Camerer and Thaler 
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(1995) that fairness is a learned manner, implies that proposers in the UG are simply 
being strategic. 
 Andreoni et al. (2003) who conducted experiments with a convex ultimatum 
game carried out a more explicit investigation of the relationship between risk 
aversion and decisions in the ultimatum game. In their game, responders are allowed 
to shrink the size of the pie and not simply make reject or accept decisions. Thus, the 
convex game is less risky to proposers than the standard game. Andreoni et al. 
(2003) report that about half of the subjects care only about money maximization, 
while the other half reveals a preference for fairness. They also find that risk 
aversion is important among money maximizing proposers who, realizing that the 
less risky convex game presents an opportunity to earn more money, exploit their 
bargaining power by making offers that are more aggressive. Carpenter et al. (2005) 
collect measures of risk aversion by survey questions and find that more risk-averse 
proposers offer more in the UG. This result, however, is not statistically significant
3
. 
 Consensus about the determinants of choices in general and the role of risk 
preferences in particular is missing also in the literature dealing with investment 
games. In the IG, the predictions of the subgame perfect equilibrium also fail to 
capture actual choices. The first part of the IG is often considered to provide a 
behavioral measure of trust, while the second part is assumed to provide a measure 
of trustworthiness. Upon careful contemplation on the motivational bases of the 
truster’s and trustee’s choices in the IG, however, it is not clear what the IG actually 
measures. Some of the influences on the decision-making process in the IG 
discussed in the literature are as follows. First, the trustee may be driven by her 
desire to reciprocate on the truster’s trust or/and they can reflect her concerns for 
altruism and fairness. In this paper, we stress the importance of including also 
strategic considerations in the analysis of   trustee’s choices. The strategic aspect of 
trustee’s decision-making, to our knowledge, has not yet been discussed in the 
literature and we will elaborate on it in detail in some of the following sections of 
the paper. Second, the truster in the IG may make her choices based on the 
                                                        
3 Carpenter et al. (2005) use a risk measure derived from the mean of the answers given on the 
following two questions: 1) they asked at what price subjects would be willing to sell a lottery ticket 
with a 50% chance of paying US$0 and a 50% chance of paying US$10; 2) they asked subjects how 
much they would be willing to pay for such a ticket. 
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expectation of reciprocation of her trust, expectation of altruistic and fairness 
concerns of her partner, her own altruistic motives, her attitude toward risk or any 
combination of the above-mentioned (see Kiyonari et al. 2006 for a discussion of 
possible determinants of behavior in the IG). 
 The trustee in the IG and the dictator in the DG face very similar behavioral 
choices. Both players must divide an endowment of a fixed size between themselves 
and another party, anyway they would prefer. The difference between the two games 
lies in who provides the endowment to be divided. While the trustee in the IG owes 
the chance to earn more on the truster, the dictator in the DG is provided the 
endowment directly from the experimenter and she owes nothing to the other party. 
The similarity between the behavioral choices that trustees and dictators are faced 
with is probably the reason why it has not been investigated in the literature whether 
the second part of the IG involves also strategic aspects (we already mentioned that 
the DG, by its nature, removes incentives for strategic behavior). In contrast, the 
uncertainty involved in the behavioral choice of the truster in the IG has attracted 
much attention and the question whether risk preferences are related to the decision 
to trust has been addressed in several experimental studies. 
 Eckel and Wilson (2004) measure risk in two risky choice tasks (one based on 
Holt and Laury 2002 and one mimicking the payoff structure of the trust game) and 
in a survey investigate the correlation between the different risk measures and the 
decision choices made in the IG. They do not find significant correlations between 
the risky choices and the trusting behavior. Ashraf, Bohnet, and Piankov (2006) use 
a measure of risk, derived from a price list procedure, and along with a number of 
demographic variables include it as an explanatory variable in a regression aiming to 
explain variations in the decision to trust. They do not find evidence that risk 
attitudes explain the variance in trust. Houser, Schunk, and Winter (2010) use a 
measure of risk based on Holt and Laury (2002) and examine whether the elicited 
risk preferences predict behavior in an investment game and a risk game with 
identical payoff structure. Their results show that risk attitudes predict decisions in 
the risk conditions but not in the trust conditions. 
 Evidence supporting the view that risk preferences predict decisions in the 
trust game is reported by Schechter (2007). He compares agents’ actions in a 
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traditional trust game and in a similar gambling game and finds that higher bets in 
the gambling game are associated with higher investments in the IG. Johansson-
Stenman, Mahmud, and Martinsson (2005) find evidence that shows stake size 
matters in the trust game and argue that one possible explanation of their results is 
that the first part of the trust game measures risk preferences rather than trust. Karlan 
(2005) reports results from a field experiment that indicate that the behavioral choice 
of the first player in the IG is determined by both trust and her propensity to take 
risks. He finds that subjects who invest more in the IG are more willing to take on 
risks. 
 The overview of the related literature shows that the question, whether the 
behavioral choices of players in the UG and the IG involve incentives for strategic 
behavior is a delicate one with a no clear answer. We adopt a novel approach to 
address this question. We report the following findings. The data from the DG 
experiments show no difference in behavioral choices between the condition with 
and without questionnaire. This result indicates that subjects’ preferences for 
fairness do not change after the act of self-reporting risk preferences. In the UG, we 
find that the act of stating one’s own risk preferences significantly alters the 
distribution of the proposers’ offers. Proposers who self-reported their risk 
preferences made on average lower offers than proposers who directly played the 
UG. From the findings in the DG, we know that this result is not triggered by a 
change in subjects’ preferences for fairness. Consequently, we conclude that 
proposers’ risk considerations change after they self-report their risk preferences and 
as a result, they make lower offers in the condition with questionnaire. In other 
words, we find support for the idea that decision-making in the UG is strategic. In 
the IG, there is no difference between the distribution of trusters’ choices in the 
condition with and without questionnaire. This result combined with the results from 
the DG and UG implies that trusters’ decisions are not driven by strategic 
considerations. We, however, argue that the first part of the IG involves a severe 
identification problem (there are many possible determinants of behavior and it is 
difficult to discern their marginal effects), which makes it very difficult to study the 
role that trusters’ risk preferences play in the determination of their strategy choices 
by a single experiment. Our findings for the second part of the IG are mixed. Trustee 
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in the condition with questionnaire give on average lower return to their partners 
than trustees in the condition without questionnaire. This difference, albeit relatively 
high (17percent), is insignificant. We, however, find a significant positive 
correlation between the decisions of trusters and trustees in the condition with 
questionnaire. In contrast, the correlation between trusters’ and trustees’ choices is 
insignificant in the condition without questionnaire. We interpret these results as 
evidence that trustees’ decisions in the IG involve strategic considerations. 
 The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the experimental design and 
procedure. Section 3 develops the research hypotheses and presents the results. 
Section 4 provides a discussion of the main results. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Experimental Design and Procedure 
 
2.1. Experimental Design 
 
We employ a two conditions between-subject design. In one condition, subjects 
directly played a standard version of the dictator game, the ultimatum game, or the 
investment game (conditions D, U, and I). In the other condition, they first filled out 
a short questionnaire asking about their risk preferences and then played one of the 
three games (conditions Q_D, Q_U, and Q_I)
4
. Each subjects participated in exactly 
one condition. Our analysis is based on comparisons of choices between conditions 
with and without questionnaire.  
 The questionnaire we use in this study is identical to the one used by 
Berninghaus et al. (2011). It consisted of three questions. All of them were adapted 
from the general risk question in the German Socio-Economic Panel Survey 
(SOEP)
5
. In the first two questions, subjects were asked whether they like taking 
risks and whether they always try to avoid risks, respectively. Admissible answers 
were “Agree,” “Disagree,” or “Neither agree nor disagree.” In the third question, 
subjects were asked to determine their risk preferences with a greater precision by 
                                                        
4 In Condition Q_U, only subjects in the role of a Proposer completed the questionnaire. 
5 The general risk question in the SOEP survey is as follows: “How do you see yourself: are you 
generally a person who is fully prepared to take risks or do you try to avoid taking risks? Please tick a 
box on the scale, where the value 0 means: “not at all willing to take risks” and the value 10 means 
“very willing to take risks”. 
9 
 
positioning themselves on a risk scale between 0 (maximal risk loving preferences) 
and 100 (maximal risk averse preferences). Upon completing the questionnaire in 
conditions Q_D, Q_U, and Q_T, participants were aware of the fact that the 
experiment included also a second task but they were not given any information 
regarding the nature of that task. 
 Economists are generally skeptical about the use of survey questions as a tool 
for measuring risk preferences with their major concern being that such questions 
are incentive incompatible. Measures of risk-preferences derived from survey 
questions are also very sensitive to framing effects. The use of risk scales, however, 
has a long history in the psychological literature and can be traced back to the 1950s 
(see Grable 2008 for an overview). Until 1980s, many different scales were 
developed but they failed to produce consistent results. MacCrimmon and Wehrung 
(1986) reason that these inconsistencies are largely due to the one-dimensional 
nature of the questions. They argue that a more accurate risk measure would be 
produced if one-dimensional questions (e.g., “how risk tolerant are you”) are 
replaced by carefully designed psychometric questionnaires that capture the 
multidimensional nature of risk. MacCrimmon and Wehrung (1986) also note that 
most people overestimate their risk tolerance on one-dimensional scales. However, 
as the general risk question in the SOEP survey indicates one-dimensional risk 
questions are still used in some household surveys.  
 Because the questionnaire we use is incentive incompatible and includes only 
one-dimensional questions, we treat the answers given on it with caution. We 
recognize that most subjects can report their underlying risk preferences only with 
an error of whose magnitude we are unaware. We incorporate the results from the 
questionnaire into our analysis but we do this because we hope that they will provide 
some additional insights about the motivational bases of the subjects’ behavior in the 
DG, UG, and IG. The focus of this paper, however, is to examine the link between 
the risk questions and behavior in the DG, UG, and IG and to use this information 
for drawing conclusions about the incentives for strategic behavior in the UG and 
IG. That is, the fact whether subjects answered the questionnaire or not is of main 
interest to us and not the exact answers given on the questionnaire. We now proceed 
with a discussion of the three games. 
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 In the DG, UG, and IG, subjects were randomly assigned an anonymous 
partner and a role—a dictator or a receiver, a proposer or a responder, and a truster 
or a trustee, respectively. Dictators in the DG had to divide an endowment of 10 
euros between themselves and their partners in any way that they preferred. 
Receivers were passive players who at the end of the experiment received the 
amount of 10 euros that was allocated to them.  
 Proposers in the UG were also asked to decide how to allocate an endowment 
of 10 euros between themselves and their partners. In contrast to the receivers in the 
DG, however, responders in the UG were not passive players but rather had the 
ability to reject proposers’ offers. Decisions in the UG were made sequentially. 
First, the proposers made an allocation suggestion. Responders were then informed 
about the offers of their partners and were asked to either accept or reject the offer 
they received. Pairs, for which the responder accepted the proposer’s offers, 
received the 10 euros in portions as determined by the proposer. Pairs, for which the 
responder rejected the proposer’s offer, did not receive the 10 euros and both 
partners had a payoff of zero. 
 In the IG, both trusters and trustees received a fee of 10 euros. The truster had 
to decide how much of her fee of 10 euros to entrust to her partner. Any amount 
entrusted by the truster was tripled by the experimenter and transferred to the 
trustee. The trustee then had to determine the amount of the tripled investment she 
wanted to return to the truster. At the end of the experiment, trusters received the 
amount of the 10 euros that they did not invest plus the part of the tripled investment 
that was returned to them by their partners. Trustees received their own fee of 10 
euros plus the amount of the tripled investment that they did not send back to the 
truster. Participants in all games had perfect knowledge about how their payoffs and 
those of their partners were calculated. 
 
2.2. Experimental Procedure 
 
All experiments were carried out at MaXLab, the experimental laboratory of the 
University of Magdeburg, between August 2011 and March 2012. Participants were 
recruited using ORSEE software (Greiner 2004) from a pool mostly of students from 
various faculties. All sessions were hand-run. The experimental instructions were 
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provided in German. We collected data from a total of 257 pairs which were 
distributed among the different conditions as follows—30 pairs in condition Q_D, 
30 pairs in condition D, 62 pairs in condition Q_U, 56 pairs in condition U, 44 pairs 
in condition Q_I, and 35 pairs in condition I. 
 Regardless of the game or condition in which subjects participated, they were 
always assigned a role and a partner using the same procedure. In all three games 
(DG, UG, and IG), we used a neutral labeling of the roles. In the experimental 
instructions, dictators, proposers, and trusters were referred to as Player 1 and 
receivers, responders, and trustees were referred to as Player 2. When subjects 
arrived at the laboratory, they were asked to draw a ball from an urn containing an 
even number of balls corresponding to the number of participants invited in the 
given session. Balls were either red or green. Balls from each color were numbered 
consecutively. Thus, the urn contained two balls of each number, one of which was 
red and the other green. Subjects who drew a red ball were assigned the role Player 1 
and subjects who drew a green ball were assigned the role Player 2. Participants who 
drew a ball labeled with the same number were matched with each other. Subjects 
who played the games in the role of Player 1 and Player 2 were seated in two 
different laboratories in a single cabin with arrangements to ensure their privacy. At 
the end of the experiment, Player 1 and Player 2 were separately paid. Thus, partners 
who played together remained anonymous during and after the experiment. During 
the experiment, no communication was allowed among the participants. The written 
instructions were explained to the subjects also orally and they were instructed to 
raise their hands if they had questions that were then answered individually.  
 In conditions Q_D, Q_U, and Q_I, immediately after filling out the 
questionnaire, subjects handed out their answer sheets and received the experimental 
instructions for the second part of the experiment. In conditions D and Q_D, the 
experiment ended when the dictators made their allocation decisions. Dictators and 
receivers were then privately paid in accordance with their own decisions or the 
decisions of their partners, respectively. In conditions U and Q_U, proposers and 
responders made their decisions sequentially. Subjects were paid as explained in the 
previous section. In conditions I and Q_I, trusters completed their decisions on an 
answer sheet and handed them to the experimenter. She then carried over these 
12 
 
decisions into the answer sheets of the trustees together with a number 
corresponding to the tripled investment and distributed them to the trustees who in 
turn made their decisions. After this, the experiment ended and subjects were 
privately paid. 
 The duration of the experiment varied across conditions, ranging between 20 
and 45 minutes. For filling out the questionnaire, no remuneration was provided. 
However, subjects were instructed that their answers will be used for a research 
project and they were asked to try to be as accurate in their answers as possible. For 
the participation in the three games, subjects were paid in accordance with their own 
decisions and the decisions of their partners. Depending on the condition and the 
role that subjects had, payoffs varied between 0 euro and 40 euros.  
 
3. Hypotheses and Results 
 
We now present our hypotheses and results. The internal consistency of preferences 
assumption of standard economic theory states that in theoretically equivalent 
situations people will always choose the same alternative. We use this assumption to 
make predictions about the relationship between the act of stating one’s own risk 
preferences and behavioral choices in the DG, UG, and IG: The act of stating one’s 
own risk preferences does not have any impact on behavioral choices made in a 
subsequently played dictator game (Hypothesis 1), ultimatum game (Hypotheses 2), 
and investment game (Hypothesis 3). We test these hypotheses for dictators in the 
DG, proposers in the UG, and both trusters and trustees in the IG. 
 The experimental data from the DG, UG, and IG experiments are given in 
Table 1. The first row of the table reports the total number of dictators in conditions 
D and Q_D, proposers in conditions U and Q_U, trusters in conditions I and Q_I, 
and trustees in conditions I and Q_I. The number of trustees in both conditions I and 
Q_I is lower than the number of trusters in the same conditions because we excluded 
from our analysis trustees who did not receive anything from their partners. In the 
next two rows, we report the mean and median choices. The mean and median 
dictator’s and proposer’s offers are expressed as a percentage of the total 
endowment of 10 euros. The mean and median truster’s investments are expressed 
as a percentage of truster’s show-up fee of 10 euros and the mean and median 
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amount trustees send back to their partner are expressed as a percentage of truster’s 
investment. The last row of the first panel reports the p-values obtained by means of 
the Wilcoxon rank-sum test, which we use to test the null hypothesis that behavioral 
choices in the conditions with and without questionnaire are independent samples 
from identical continuous distributions with equal medians. For the moment, we 
postpone the discussion of the results depicted in the lower panel of Table 1. 
 
TABLE I 
Summary statistics from the Dictator, Ultimatum, and Investment Games 
Condition  D Q_D  U Q_U  I Q_I  I Q_I 
   Dictators  Proposers  Trusters  Trustees 
Participants 30 30  56 62  34 44  25 35  
Mean   23% 24%  43.2%39.5% 43.1%46.0% 132% 120%  
Median   20% 20%  50% 40%  40% 50%  150% 133% 
p-value  0.74   0.045   0.65   0.37 
      (**) 
Correlation -   -   -    0.13 0.42  
p-value  -   -   -    0.26 0.006 
(one-tailed)           (***) 
* Significant at the 10 percent level 
** Significant at the 5 percent level 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level 
 
 Looking first at the summery data from the DG experiments, we observe that 
dictators from condition Q_D made a slightly higher average offer than dictators in 
condition D did. The median dictator’s offers are identical in both conditions. The p-
value of 0.74 indicates that dictators’ allocations in condition Q_D were not affected 
by the act of answering the questionnaire. Panel a) in Figure 1 also confirms this 
observation. It shows that the histograms of dictators’ offers in conditions Q_D and 
D are indeed very similar. Based on these findings, we cannot reject Hypothesis 1. 
We conclude that the act of stating one’s own risk preference does not change 
subjects’ preferences for fairness. This observation will be useful when we analyze 
the results from the UG experiments. 
 Proposers in the UG made an average offer of 39.5 percent in condition Q_U, 
which is 3.7 percent lower than the average offer from condition U. The difference 
between choices in conditions U and Q_U is more pronounced when we look at the 
median offer. While in condition U, the median proposer offered half of the total 
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prize to her partner, the median proposer in condition Q_U was less generous and 
offered only 40 percent. The null hypothesis that offers from condition U and Q_U 
are independent samples from identical continuous distributions with equal medians 
is rejected at the 5 percent level (p-value = 0.045). This result indicates that 
proposers who filled out the questionnaire about their own risk preferences were 
more often making offers different from the equal (and presumably fair) division 
than proposers who did not complete the questionnaire. The difference between the 
distribution of proposers’ offers in condition U and Q_U is also easy to see in panel 
b) of Figure 1. The relative frequencies of offers between 1 euro and 5 euros are 
higher in condition Q_U. Offers of exactly 5 euros, however, were made more often 
in condition U than in condition Q_U. These results indicate that the act of stating 
one’s own risk preferences significantly alters behavioral choices in the UG and we 
thus reject Hypothesis 2. The observation from the DG experiments that subjects’ 
preferences for fairness do not change after completing the risk questionnaire 
implies that the change in behavioral choices in the UG has been induced by a 
change in subjects’ risk considerations. That is, our data provide evidence that 
proposers’ behavioral choices are strategic. In the next section, we will comment in 
more detail on the effect we observe in the UG experiments. We now look at the 
results from the IG. 
 The experimental data for trusters in the IG indicate that subjects who first 
answered the questionnaire offered on average a bit more than subjects who did not 
answer the questionnaire. The median truster in condition Q_I invested 50 percent of 
her show-up fee, which is 10 percent more than the median truster in condition I. 
The distributions of investments in the two conditions, however, are not 
significantly different (p-value = 0.65). In panel c) of Figure 1, we also observe that 
the relative frequencies with which investments from all magnitudes occur are 
indeed very similar in the two conditions. Hence, the act of completing the 
questionnaire did not change the distribution of behavioral choices in the first part of 
the IG and we cannot reject Hypothesis 3 (for trusters). We will postpone the 
discussion of the question whether trusters’ decisions are strategic until the next 
section. 
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FIGURE 1.—Distribution of choices in the DG, UG, and IG 
 The last two columns of Table 2 summarize the experimental data of trustees’ 
decisions. We observe that the average and median amounts returned (expressed as a 
percentage of the initial investments) in condition Q_I are 12 and 17 percent, 
respectively lower than in condition I. This difference is large but statistically 
insignificant (p-value = 0.37). The sample size of trustees in both conditions is 
relatively small and it is difficult to draw conclusions whether the insignificant p-
value is due to a lack of effect of the questionnaire on trustees’ behavioral choices or 
it is an artifact of the small sample size. To gain some additional insights on this 
question, we examine the histograms of trustees choices depicted in panel d) of 
Figure 1. The histogram from the choices in condition Q_I bears some resemblance 
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to the uniform distribution. There are choices in the interval between 0 percent and 
200 percent that are never played but all choices that are played are chosen with 
approximately the same frequency (there is an exception at 43 percent, a choice 
made by a single trustee). In contrast, in condition I, there is an upward trend in the 
relative frequencies of trustees’ choices with the peak of the distribution being at 
200 percent. The different forms of the empirical distributions of trustees’ decisions 
in conditions Q_I and I suggest that trustees who completed the questionnaire might 
have had different motivational bases from subjects who did not complete the 
questionnaire. In an attempt to understand this difference, we look closer at the 
determinants of trustees’ behavior. 
 We already argued that trustees in the IG and dictators in the DG face very 
similar behavioral choices. Both types of players must divide an endowment of a 
fixed size between themselves and another party in any way that they prefer. The 
difference between the two games lies in who provides the endowment to be 
divided. While the trustee in the IG owes the chance to earn more on the truster, the 
dictator in the DG is provided the endowment directly from the experimenter and 
she owes nothing to the other party. The behaviorally identical decision situations 
faced by trustees and dictators suggest that we should observe similar empirical 
distributions of choices made by trustees and dictators. A comparison between panel 
a) and panel d) of Figure 1 reveals that this is not the case. The difference in the 
distribution of actual choices of trustees and dictators suggest that different factors 
determine behavior of the two types of players. 
  It is interesting to observe that the empirical distribution of trustees choices 
(in condition I) is in fact very similar to the empirical distribution of proposers’ 
offers in the UG (see panel b) and d) of Figure 1). To make the choices of proposers 
and trustees directly comparable, we first computed, for each pair in the IG, the total 
size of the prize or the combined amount of money received by the players (it varies 
with the different levels of investment made by trusters), and then we calculated the 
percentage of the total prize that was received by each truster. Trusters have some 
control over the division of the total prize by deciding how much from their show-up 
fee to pass on to their partners. The less they invest, the more even will the 
distribution of the prize for any decision of the trustees be. However, as any amount 
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invested is tripled the driving force behind the shape of the distribution of the total 
prize between the two players is in the control of trustees. In panel e) of Figure 1, we 
plot the relative frequency with which each possible distribution of the total prize 
occurred in the IG. The data depicted in panel e) is more directly comparable to the 
data depicted in panel b) and it confirms the impression that the distribution of 
proposers’ offers in the UG is very similar to the distribution of trustees’ choices in 
the IG. This observation is interesting because proposers and trustees are faced with 
inherently different behavioral choices. The similarity between the distributions of 
actual choices, however, suggests that people might perceive the two decision 
situations as being similar. Andreoni et al. (2003) find that half of the subjects in the 
UG care only about money-maximization, while the other half reveal a preference 
for fairness. This means that proposers who are only interested in the maximization 
of their own pay-off, form expectations about the expectation of their partners and 
make the minimal offer that they believe will be accepted. Dufwenberg and Gneezy 
(2000) measure beliefs in an experimental game similar to the IG and find that the 
amount that trustees give back to their partners is positively correlated with trustees’ 
expectations of trusters’ return expectations. It is reasonable to assume that part of 
the total population of trustees cares about fairness exactly as some of the proposers. 
Combining the results of Andreoni et al. (2003) and Dufwenberg and Gneezy 
(2000), it is clear that the factors motivating proposers and trustees are very 
similar—one part of both types of players care about fairness and make choices 
leading to the equal distribution of the prize, and the other part of players make 
choices that are the best responses to their expectations of the other party’s 
expectations. This conclusion finds support in our data (see panel b) and e) of Figure 
1). 
 We argued earlier in this section that proposers in the UG who answered the 
questionnaire make offers that are lower than the offers made by proposers who 
directly play the game. Also, we find evidence that trustees in the IG and proposers 
in the UG perceive the decision situations they face as similar. Trustees who 
completed the questionnaire also return less to their partners than trustees who 
played the IG right away and when graphed, the empirical distributions from the 
condition Q_I and I take a different form. The Wilcoxon rank-sum test, however, 
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reveals no significant difference between the two distributions. These somehow 
conflicting results motivate us to investigate another aspect of trustees’ behavior—
namely the reciprocation of trusters’ trust. 
 Berg et al. (1995) address the question on whether being trusted by someone 
makes the trusted more trustworthy by studying the correlation between the amount 
invested by trusters’ and the amount returned by trustees (expressed as a percentage 
of the show-up fee and the tripled investment, respectively). Berg et al. (1995) do 
not find significant correlation between the choices of trusters and trustees and 
reason that the trustee’s decision is not affected by how much she is trusted by her 
partner. Snijders and Keren (1999) and Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2000) use similar 
designs and also fail to find significant correlations. We calculated the Spearman 
correlation coefficients between trusters’ and trustees’ choices (expressed as a 
percentage of the show-up fee of 10 euros and the tripled investment, respectively) 
in condition I and Q_I. These correlations together with their p-values are presented 
in the last two rows of Table I. In condition I, consistent with the results of previous 
studies, we find no significant correlation. In contrast, in condition Q_I, the positive 
correlation of 0.42 is significant at the 1 percent level and indicates that trustees who 
answered the questionnaire reciprocate the trust bestowed on them by their partners. 
Based on our findings about the behavioral choices of trustees in conditions Q_I and 
I, we argue that our experimental data provides some evidence that trustees’ 
decisions include also strategic elements. 
 To supplement our analysis about the role of risk preferences in the DG, UG, 
and IG we now discuss how the answers, given for question three of the 
questionnaire, relate to behavioral choices in the three games. The distributions of 
self-reported risk preferences on the risk scale in the DG, UG, and IG are 
statistically identical. We pool the data from the three games together and plot the 
resulted empirical distribution in panel f) of Figure 1. The empirical distribution of 
self-reported risk preferences is approximately symmetric around 50. Slightly more 
subjects scored a value less than 50 on the scale (54 percent), where values to the 
left of 50 are associated with higher risk tolerance. This result is different from the 
results of Holt and Laury (2002) who find that the majority of people are risk-
averse. MacCrimmon and Wehrung (1986) note that most people overestimate their 
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risk tolerance on one-dimensional scales. Hence, the difference between our results 
and those of Holt and Laury (2002) should come as no surprise. 
 We already briefly discussed that incentive incompatible questionnaires and 
one-dimensional questions might not provide a reliable measure of risk preferences. 
However, it is interesting to analyze how the correlations between self-reported risk 
preferences and behavioral choices in the DG, UG, and IG relate to our findings. In 
Table II, we report all Spearman correlation coefficients along with their p-values. 
 
Table II 
Correlations between self-reported risk preferences and behavioral choices in the 
DG, UG, and IG 
 Condition    Q_D  Q_U  Q_I  Q_I 
     Dictators Proposers Trusters Trustees 
Correlation     - 0.01 0.41   - 0.23 0.24 
p-value (one-tailed)  0.31  0.0005  0.069   0.08 
       (***)  (*)  (*) 
* Significant at the 10 percent level 
** Significant at the 5 percent level 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level 
 
 In the DG, the correlation coefficient is insignificant. This result is in line with 
the intuition that risk preferences do not determine behavior in the DG. We find a 
positive correlation between self-reported risk preferences and offers in the UG, 
which is significant at the 1 percent level. Because higher scores on the risk scales 
are associated with higher risk- aversion, a positive correlation in the UG means that 
more risk-averse subjects tend to make higher offers. The positive correlation in the 
UG confirms our previous results that risk preferences are important for choosing 
offers in the UG. In the IG, there is some evidence that self-reported risk preferences 
are negatively correlated with trusters’ investments (meaning that more risk-averse 
subjects invest less) and positively correlated with trustees’ choices (meaning that 
more risk averse subjects return more to their partners). These correlations, however, 
are significant only at the 10 percent level. 
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4. Discussion 
 
In this section we discuss some possible explanations of the effects that the act of 
stating one’s own risk preferences produces on behavioral choices in the UG and IG. 
 In the UG, we find that proposers who answered the questionnaire made lower 
offers than proposers who did not answer the questionnaire. There is, however, a 
significant positive correlation between the answers given on the questionnaire and 
offers made in the UG, suggesting that more risk-averse subjects make higher offers. 
We explain these results by the following argument. The act of answering the 
questionnaire makes subjects think about risk. When they are presented with the 
UG, they probably try to evaluate how risky each possible offer is by making 
expectations about the actions of their partners. Making small offers, such as 10 or 
20 percent of the total endowment, involves high risk because small offers might be 
perceived as offensive or unfair by responders who might be willing to punish the 
greedy proposers by rejecting these offers. Rejecting small offers is attractive for 
proposers because in this way they can punish their partners, without incurring too 
high personal costs. Offers higher than 20 percent but less than that of equal division 
make the cost of rejecting for responders substantial and proposers might think it is 
reasonable to assume that such offers will be seldom rejected. Offering 50 percent of 
the total endowment involves almost no risk but this strategy is not very profitable 
for the proposers. The most attractive strategy for proposers therefore is to make 
offers between 20 percent and 50 percent. This is exactly what we observe in 
condition Q_U where the median offer is 40 percent. The act of answering the 
questionnaire might be interpreted as a catalyst that makes proposers realize their 
bargaining power and as a result take a full advantage of it. In contrast, proposers 
who did not answer the questionnaire are less aware of their bargaining power and 
make higher and safer offers. This explanation is consistent with the results of 
Andreoni et al. (2003) who find that proposers offer less in a convex ultimatum 
game in which they have more bargaining power than in the standard ultimatum 
game. 
 In the IG, we do not find evidence that self-reporting risk preferences 
influences trusters’ choices. The results from the UG suggest that the act of 
completing the risk questionnaire changes subjects’ risk consideration. The failure 
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of the risk questionnaire to alter the distribution of trusters’ choices could then be 
interpreted as evidence that trusters’ decisions are not related to risk preferences. 
This conclusion, however, might be incorrect because of at least two reasons. First, 
it is not straightforward to determine what investments will be attractive for subjects 
with different levels of risk aversion. It is often assumed in the literature that less 
risk-averse people will be willing to invest more in the IG (see e.g. Schechter 2007). 
But this assumption is not easy to justify. Ahmed (2011), for example, examines 
whether the return (which trusters earn on their investment) as a proportion of the 
investment in the IG is increasing with the investment. He finds that marginal effects 
of investment are constant. That is, whatever amount trusters invest, they earn on 
average the same return. If a truster could somehow expect this, as soon as she 
decides to put some of her show-up fee at risk, she will always be better off when 
she invests higher amounts and whatever her risk preferences are she will probably 
prefer to invest more than less. This is just an example, but it illustrates an important 
point—different assumptions about the returns that might be expected for different 
levels of investment can make the same behavioral choice attractive for both risk-
loving and risk-averse individuals. A second difficulty in discerning the 
motivational bases of trusters’ behavior arises from the fact that too many factors 
influence choices in the first part of the IG. Trusters in the IG may make choices 
based on the expectation of reciprocation of their trust, expectation of altruistic and 
fairness concerns of their partner, their own altruistic motives, their attitude toward 
risk, or any combination of the above-mentioned. This means that if we are able to 
somehow manipulate the subjects’ risk preferences or risk considerations (for 
example, by making them report their risk preferences on a questionnaire), it will 
still be difficult to expect a specific effect on trusters’ choices because we do not 
know how risk preferences interact with the other determinants of behavior and 
whether these other determinants stayed constant after the manipulation of risk 
preferences. To sum it up, we believe that because of the specific nature of the first 
part of the IG, it is very difficult to find strong experimental evidence that risk 
preferences are important determinants of trusters’ behavior. 
 In the second part of the IG, we find that the median choice in condition Q_I is 
17 percent lower than the median choice in condition I. This difference is 
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considerable (although statistically insignificant) and one argument that can explain 
it is as follows: Trustees who completed the questionnaire realized that the decision 
of trusters’ involves uncertainty and the risk of making losses. They also realized 
that trusters’ make their investment decisions with the full awareness of the risk they 
face. Trustees then might conclude that trusters’ at the time of making their choices 
are prepared to incur some losses on their investments but are willing to run this risk 
in order to take the chance of earning high returns. In other words, trustees might 
guess that trusters’ return expectations are lower than a return associated with an 
equal division and as a result do not feel any moral obligation to give too generous 
returns. In contrast, trustees who did not complete the questionnaire are thinking less 
about the expectations of their partners and as a result, they give on average higher 
returns. This reasoning resembles very much the reasoning we used in explaining 
the results from the UG. This is not by chance, because as we already argued, we 
find some evidence in our data that trustees in the IG perceive their decision 
situation as similar to the way proposers in the UG perceive their decision situation 
(see e. g. panel e) and b) of Figure 1, or the discussion in Andreoni et al. 2003 and 
Dufwenberg and Gneezy 2000). As we find that behavioral choices in the UG are 
strategic, it follows from the latter argument that trustees’ choices in the IG might 
also be driven by some strategic considerations. Another result from the second part 
of the IG is that we find evidence that trustees in condition Q_I, but not in condition 
I, care about reciprocation. We reason from all these observations, that trustees’ 
decisions involve strategic considerations.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
In this study, we focus on two types of goals. First, we are interested in extending 
the result of Berninghaus et al. (2011) such that strategic behavior in a coordination 
game is systematically altered by the act of reporting one’s own risk preferences to 
three further games—the dictator, ultimatum, and investment games. Second, we 
explicitly address the question, whether behavior in the UG and IG is strategic or is 
entirely driven by other nonstrategic considerations. 
 We use an experimental design based on two conditions between-subject 
comparison. In one condition, subjects’ only task was to play one of the three games 
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we consider. In the other condition, subjects first stated their own risk preferences 
on a short questionnaire and then they played one of the games. We hypothesize that 
the act of self-reporting risk preferences will not alter behavioral choices in the 
subsequently played economic games (internal consistency of preferences 
assumption). This hypothesis finds no support for the coordination game experiment 
reported by Berninghaus et al. (2011). Our analysis of the DG, UG, and IG show 
that self-reporting risk preferences does not alter dictators’ offers and trusters’ 
investments, while it significantly decreases proposers’ offers and leads to a 
substantial decrease in the amount trustees’ give back to their partners. 
 Our results from the DG experiments show that the act of completing the risk 
questionnaire does not influence subjects’ preferences for fairness. Combining this 
finding with the results from the UG experiments, we conclude that the change in 
the proposers’ offers triggered by the act of self-reporting risk preferences is induced 
by a change in the subjects’ risk considerations. In other words, our experimental 
data indicate that behavioral choices of proposers in the UG are strategic. In the IG, 
we do not find a significant difference between the empirical distributions of 
trusters’ choices in the conditions with and without questionnaire. This result 
implies that decisions in the first part of the IG are not strategic. We, however, also 
offer an alternative explanation of our findings. We argue, that because of the 
specific nature of the decision situation trusters’ face in the IG (i.e., there are many 
factors that influence behavioral choices), it is difficult to specify in what way risk 
preferences would relate to trusters’ decisions, were they important for the 
determination of behavioral choices. That is, there is a nontrivial identification 
problem in the first part of the IG. Our experimental design does not explicitly 
address this identification problem and it might, therefore, be inappropriate to study 
the relationship between risk preferences and trusters’ choices. 
 In the second part of the IG, along with the result that, self-reporting risk 
preferences substantially decreases the amount trustees send to their partners, we 
also find that only trustees who self-reported their risk preferences on the 
questionnaire show concerns for reciprocation. We also argue that trustees in the IG 
and proposers in the UG perceive the decision situations they face as similar. Our 
conclusion is that the behavioral choices of trustees include also strategic elements. 
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